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In the mid-1980s, I used to walk twice a week between my home institution, l’Université du 
Québec à Montréal, and Montreal’s main English-language university, McGill.  The distance is 
only a few kilometres but I never ceased to feel that I was moving from one world to another.  
My McGill students might have been curious about their counterparts in the overwhelmingly 
French-speaking Eastern part of the city. If they ever ventured in that direction, however, it was a 
foray into an exotic terra incognita. My Université du Québec students resented my suggestions 
that they use the McGill Library, a facility to which they were entitled by virtue of an inter-
university accord.  The very thought of penetrating into the Anglo citadel was intimidating. 
I was reminded of these and many other Montreal experiences while reading Gary Cohen’s 
fascinating book, The Politics of Ethnic Survival:  Germans in Prague 1867-1914.  Prague, like 
Montreal, was a city reclaimed by its original inhabitants. A new Czech majority retook Prague in 
the second half of the nineteenth century, just as Francophones reasserted their numerical and 
political superiority in Montreal a century later. The  former and subsequent dominant groups 
coexisted, peacefully but uneasily. The flavour of their life together is captured in a striking 
vignette quoted by Cohen: 
 
He never lit a cigar with a match from the Czech School Society (matice šokolská) nor 
did the  Czech light his with matches from the German School Society (Deutscher 
Schulverein) ... even the concerts were ethnically exclusive as were the public swimming 
facilities, parks, playgrounds, most restaurants, cafes, and businesses.  The Czechs’ corso 
was Ferdinandová (now Národní), that of the Germans, Na příkopě (Cohen 1981: 124). 
 
Well, Montreal is not and was not as divided as this, but then Prague was probably not quite like 
this either. I can swear though that the smell of tobacco (I am referring to an age, twenty years 
ago, when smoking in public places was still licit) was different at the Université du Québec and 
at McGill: Gauloises in the former case, American cigarettes in the latter. Given the weight of 
interethnic realities, so forcefully brought out i n Cohen’s book, it is not surprising that a 
disproportionate number of scholars of nationalism, even at a later period, should be Pragers in  
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origin:  among those who come to mind are Hans Lemberg, Hans Kohn, Karl Deutsch, Ernest 
Gellner, Miroslav Hroch. 
It is probably a coincidence that Will Kymlicka is, I understand, Czech in origin. It is certainly 
not accidental, however, that he is Canadian. Thinking about interethnic relations from a moral 
perspective is something of a Canadian specialty. In 1979, long before such issues had entered 
the mainstream of academic debate, the Canadian Philosophical Association published a 
symposium entitled Philosophers Look at Canadian Confederation. The conventions of Canadian 
discourse dictate bilingualism so this book also bore the title La confédération canadienne, qu'en 
pensent les philosophes? The proportion of English-language to French-language contributions 
was approximately 3:1, not far from the actual distribution of English to French speakers in 
Canada. The keynote piece, entitled “Must Nations Become States?” was delivered by Charles 
Taylor, another Canadian, who is surely the world’s foremost philosopher engaged with ethnic or 
multicultural issues. Kymlicka has both followed in Taylor’s footsteps and marked out  new 
directions on his own in this area. 
Reflection on inter-ethnic issues, within a moral framework dominated by values of fairness 
and social responsibility, continues to absorb Canadian intellectuals. Indeed, both Francophone 
and Anglophone Canadian intelligentsias are shaped by the search for an identity that would 
define their relationship to each other and, increasingly, to other groups in the country, such as 
indigenous peoples and “visible minorities”, i.e. non-European immigrants.  Is Quebec 
Nationalism Just? Perspectives from Anglophone Canada reads the title of a recent book edited 
by Joseph Carens of the University of Toronto. And an even more recent symposium on  The 
Morality of Nationalism, held in Illinois, drew a disproportionate number of Canadian 
contributors, including both Kymlicka and Taylor. 
One can easily understand why the Canadian experience would serve as a reference point in 
the search for a liberal perspective on interethnic relations. Canadian practices approach the 
standards of liberal pluralism, defined by Kymlicka as the public recognition and accommodation 
of diversity, more closely than do those of most other countries.  Canada is both a polyethnic and 
a multiethnic nation in Kymlicka’s terms (Kymlicka 2001b: 11). It is ‘polyethnic’ because it 
contains immigrant ethnic groups, and it is ‘multiethnic’ because it encompasses ‘national 
minorities’, defined as pre-existing “groups that formed complete and functioning societies on 
their homeland prior to being incorporated into a larger state” (Kymlicka and Opalski 2001a: 23).   
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In fact, Canada displays the two types of national minorities which Kymlicka differentiates: 
“substate nations, [which] would have liked to form their own states, but lost in the struggle for 
political power” (Kymlicka and Opalski 2001a: 24; the Québécois are mentioned here 
specifically) and “indigenous peoples” who existed “outside [the] system of European states” 
(ibid.). Of course, other countries contain one or another, or even all of these types of groups.  
There is, however, a unique Canadian sensibility which not only acknowledges the existence of 
such groups but also makes their condition a continued subject of national debate and considers 
them constitutive of Canada’s complex and multi-layered identity. 
The Canadian template explains many of both the strengths and weaknesses of the case that 
Kymlicka makes in his book in favour of ‘exporting’ liberal pluralism to East and Central 
Europe. Before proceeding further with this argument, however, I must emit a protest at the 
notion of ‘exporting’ liberal pluralism. Kymlicka may put ‘exporting’ into inverted commas 
(Kymlicka and Opalski 2001a: 4) and he is perhaps using the term ironically. Certainly, the thrust 
of his argument suggests that it is not a matter of ‘exporting’ anything but of reflecting upon the 
pertinence to the post-communist world of practiced or imagined modes of accommodation 
among ethnic groups.  Both the term ‘export’ and the economic logic behind it appear to me to be 
thoroughly unsuitable. 
Kymlicka states at the very outset that one of his objectives is to demonstrate that 
“conventional ways of distinguishing between ethnic relations in the West and East are 
unhelpful” (Kymlicka and Opalski 2001a: 3). If by this he means only the ‘civic (Western) 
nationalism’ versus ‘ethnic (Eastern) nationalism’ distinction, he is beating a dead horse.  To be 
sure, it was Kymlicka himself who helped to kill the horse, notably in a 1995 review article 
entitled “Misunderstanding Nationalism” (reprinted in Kymlicka 1999). Since then, however, the 
‘civic’ versus ‘ethnic’ distinction has been flogged repeatedly (e.g.Yack 1999), even by those, 
such as Rogers Brubaker, who had once promoted it (cf. Brubaker 1999 and Brubaker 1992).  In 
any case, there is little danger – I use the term ironically – that citizens, belonging either to the 
majorities or to minorities, in the post-communist countries would be tempted to see their state as 
an ethnically neutral civic nation founded uniquely upon universal values and upon t he 
attachment to abstract constitutional principles. The occasional official bows in that direction, 
coming from such countries as Russia or, in earlier days, from Kazakhstan, just reek with  
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insincerity and are rightly seen as lip service to the dominant discourse of the powers that be who 
call themselves the international community. 
Another distinction that Kymlicka repudiates appears to me, however, to be one that should be 
upheld. This is the distinction between ‘Old World’ and ‘New World’ or ‘Old World 
democracies’ and ‘New World democracies’ (Kymlicka and Opalski 2001a: 70).  In Kymlicka’s 
words, “there are differences between New World and Old World countries, of course, but they 
are often less significant than the difference between the different types of groups  within 
[emphasis in original] both Old World and New World countries” (Kymlicka and Opalski 2001a: 
72).  As Michael Walzer puts it in his commentary on Kymlicka, the difference between ‘nation 
states’ (Old States) and ‘immigrant societies’ (New States) entails a different national culture:  
‘thinner’ in the latter case, ‘thicker’ in the former (Kymlicka and Opalski 2001a: 151).  The 
distinction between societies that take account of immigrants and those that do not is not one 
between East and West. In France where, as Kymlicka rightly argues, there is some movement 
towards acknowledging the presence of minorities, there is an absolute barrier towards extending 
such acknowledgement to immigrant groups. The notion of a polyethnicity which would 
encompass such groups is greeted derisively as yet another American lubie in the same category 
of aberrations as multiculturalism or political correctness.  ‘Old World’ and ‘New World’ do not 
converge here. 
Kymlicka may be prescient (although I have my doubts) in arguing that ‘Old States’ can 
redefine themselves as ‘New States’. The declining birth rate in Europe may soon make the 
continent dependent on large-scale immigration which can only come from outside the continent.  
These immigrants cannot be democratically confined to metic status, i.e. to the status of resident 
foreigners, but it is unlikely that they will be as fully assimilated as previous waves of 
immigration have been.  Not only their numbers but their expectations will be unprecedented, due 
to the universal impact of identity politics and the new dynamics of diaspora-homeland relations.  
France, for instance, has succeeded in swallowing waves of Italian, Spanish, Polish and East 
European Jewish immigration but it may have reached the limits of its assimilationist capacity 
with respect to its several million strong North African population.  The trend towards reliance on 
extra-European immigration will be extended to the post-communist countries, probably in the 
order in which they join the European Union. Such changes will provoke powerful pressure 
towards a radical shift in political culture but they will engender even stronger resistance towards  
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such pressure, and far more so in the ex-communist countries than in Western Europe. ‘Old’ 
states will not willingly metamorphose into ‘New’ states.  
In any case, it will prove difficult to be both an ‘Old State’ and a ‘New State’ at the same time.  
There is, however, one country that manages to combine both types of state. English Canada has 
become an immigrant society par excellence whereas Quebec has evolved into a nation state.  To 
be sure, the features of an immigrant society have rubbed off on Quebec as well, more so than the 
features of a nation state have affected English Canada. This is perhaps because English Canada’s 
identity rests precisely on the idea of not being a nation state but part of a bilingual, multicultural 
society.
1 Kymlicka is, if course, keenly aware of these specificities. He is correct in saying that 
the “Québécois in Canada have far more in common with the Catalans in Spain ... than they do 
with recent immigrants to Canada” (Kymlicka and Opalski 2001a: 72). Still, the prolonged and 
hitherto successful coexistence of a nation state and an immigrant society within one political 
framework in Canada encourages Kymlicka in the belief that these divergent models are 
compatible in the post-communist context as well. 
Similarly, Kymlicka is not apprehensive about the simultaneous existence of two or more 
nation building projects within the  same polity. He recognizes, realistically, that every state 
undertakes a nation building process, though the further this process lies in the past the more 
successful it is likely to have been.
2  Kymlicka sees no reason why state nation building and sub-
state nation building should not go on at the same time. This, after all, is the case in Canada 
where a conscious nation building project, proudly labelled as such in Quebec, has accompanied 
a much more diffuse national policy in English Canada. In the light of this experience why should 
it be impossible to have two or even more simultaneous nation building projects within a post-
communist state? 
Canada’s generally positive experience of interethnic coexistence thus colours Kymlicka’s 
outlook on the post-communist world and, occasionally, skewers his judgement. It is significant 
that Kymlicka compares the Québécois not only (correctly) to Catalans in Spain but also 
                                                 
1 If Walzer (Kymlicka and Opalski 2001a: 152) is correct that the thicker the ‘national’ culture, the more likely large 
groups of immigrants will have to be accommodated as national minorities rather than as hyphenated nationals, one 
may conclude that the future of ‘cultural communities’, i.e. immigrant groups, in Quebec lies in the direction of 
national minority status.  No Quebec government, of any political complexion, would accept this conclusion.  
2 Kymlicka (Kymlicka and Opalski: 86 note 13) cites David Laitin who argues that “the linguistic assimilation of 
national minorities is unlikely to occur after the start of mass literacy”.   
        6 
 
(incorrectly) to Hungarians in Romania (Kymlicka and Opalski 2001a: 72). If anything, the 
Hungarians of Romania are comparable to the Anglos of Quebec:  a formerly dominant people, 
still enjoying a considerable amount of prestige and withholding full-fledged allegiance to the 
immediate political authorities who govern them. In this respect, Kymlicka  is wrong too in 
asserting that post-communist minorities are unique in living with kin states across the borders.  
Anglo-Québécois have their kin state in English Canada; the fact that Ottawa may not be 
unconditionally committed to this minority because the federal government itself reflects the 
composite identity of Canada as a whole is compensated by the fact that Ottawa has authority 
over Quebec in a way that Budapest does not have authority over Transylvania. 
In fact, Kymlicka underestimates the deep incommensurability between various nation-
building projects. This misjudgement too may be dictated by a particularly benign perspective on 
the Quebec experience. It is a simplification to say, “immigrants in Quebec typically choose 
integration into the francophone societal culture” (Kymlicka and Opalski 2001a: 51).  Immigrants 
typically did not choose integration into French-speaking rather than English-speaking Quebec 
until school and language laws compelled them to do so. Even today, immigrants or ‘allophones’ 
as they are known in Quebec are more likely to be bilingual, English and French (or trilingual, 
counting their mother tongue) than ethnic Québécois. The latter are still designated by the 
colourful and significant term of ‘Québécois pure laine’, i.e. ‘pure wool Québécois’. It is true that 
there are no colour or ethnic barriers to becoming a Québécois. One can even overcome the 
barrier posed by speaking a non-Québécois variant of French. There is, however, a loyalty 
barrier. Neo-Québécois will not be considered Québécois  tout court unless their primary and 
overt loyalty is to Quebec. This implies they renounce not only loyalty to their country of origin 
(which is natural enough) but also primary loyalty to Canada. 
Kymlicka accepts that any nation-building project entails a certain amount of coercion and he 
recognizes that it is extremely difficult for minorities who are being oppressed to prove their 
capacity for liberal governance. However, with Canadian optimism, he does not seem willing to 
fully integrate this knowledge into his vision of the post-communist world. This comes out most 
clearly in his incisive but unfair critique of the emphasis that the OSCE’s High Commissioner on 
National Minorities puts on the security factor over considerations of justice (Kymlicka and 
Opalski 2001a: 372-386). Kymlicka is correct that, in Central and Eastern Europe, the fears of 
minorities, and of majorities too, concerning their own survival represent an acute existential  
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paranoia. Moreover, security concerns are blown up artificially to conveniently avoid the sort of 
liberal policies that Kymlicka is advocating. Even paranoids, however, face real dangers. 
Kymlicka is impatient with paranoia.  After all, Quebec suffers such fears too and this has not 
prevented it from developing as a liberal society.
3 One cannot seriously talk of minorities in 
Quebec as being disenfranchised or oppressed. But then Quebec has not experienced the 
wrenching changes of borders that every post-communist state has known within living memory.  
Nor has it been a victim of state failure, which, as George Schöpflin reminds us in his 
contribution to this volume, has been the fate of every European state in the last century, with the 
exception of Switzerland (Kymlicka and Opalski 2001a: 117). Notwithstanding such benign 
circumstances, a non-nationalist Quebec government felt it necessary to decree official 
unilingualism and successive governments have worked hard to banish public displays of any 
language other than French. Clearly, even liberal societies are readily driven to illiberal positions. 
Kymlicka’s single-mindedness regarding the liberal pluralist model also prompts him to 
promote the formula of territorial autonomy and to belittle the prospect that territorial autonomy 
might lead to secession  or state disintegration. He patiently rebuts objections  – such as the 
argument that territorial autonomy would empower illiberal minorities as majorities in new 
territorial units or that it would not help dispersed minorities – to argue that territorial autonomy 
has worked well in the West and deserves a hearing in the East (Kymlicka and Opalski 2001a: 
362). But then Kymlicka is not terribly concerned about secession. He believes that in all the 
Western cases he cites – Quebec, Scotland, Catalonia, Puerto Rico – secession would still leave 
the rump states as “viable and prosperous democracies” (Kymlicka and Opalski 2001a: 392).  
The problem in the East, as Kymlicka sees it, is to convince these timorous countries that they too 
would be just as well off after secession as before. 
Canadians under the age of fifty have lived with the real prospect of secession all of their adult 
lives. Discussion of the ‘National Question’ or the ‘Quebec Problem’ in the press, at conferences, 
in barroom conversations, or at family dinner tables has been a national pastime, in both 
                                                 
3 The following reflection by a Quebec intellectual of moderately nationalist views has a very East European ring to 
it. In fact, it echoes the thought of the Hungarian philosopher, István Bibó, whom Kymlicka quotes. The former 
rector of the Université du Québec à Montréal writes:  “... je suis chaque jour davantage touché par la modestie 
numérique de la société québécoise à l'échelle du monde. Les petites nations vivent dangereu sement, quelle que soit 
leur forme constitutionnelle”.  He comforts himself with the thought that “la petite taille présente pourtant des 
avantages: elle prive des moyens de nuire aux autres ... elle invite chacun de ses membres à un effort accru 
d'ingéniosité, de créativité, de dépassement”. And finally, he adds “nous avons le bonheur de parler une grande 
langue”  (Corbo 1992: 47). This is a ‘bonheur’ that Central and East Europeans, with the exception of Russians, 
cannot claim.  
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languages. One can hardly imagine what Canadians would seriously talk about if they did not 
have this subject. The result is that the prospect of secession has been routinized and trivialized.  
To some extent, this has been a conscious policy. Québécois nationalists have taken care not to 
dissipate the belief of a majority of Québécois that after Quebec’s independence they would be 
able to hold on to their Canadian passports (as they could indeed, if Canada still authorized dual 
nationality) and that they could continue to elect members of the federal Parliament in Ottawa (a 
more doubtful proposition). Some parts of English Canadian opinion have convinced themselves 
that they would be better off without Quebec and the further West one goes in Canada the 
stronger this opinion.  The Canadian consensus, shared by Kymlicka, is that secession would be 
‘no big deal’. 
There was, however, a revealing moment when this admirable Canadian placidity was briefly 
shattered. On the eve of Quebec’s second referendum on independence in 1995 (“if at first you 
don’t secede, try, try again,” said the wags) polls showed that the independence option would 
probably win. The result was an emotional outpouring, comparable in intensity, if I may be 
allowed the analogy, to British reaction upon the death of Diana. Hundreds of thousands of 
Canadians demonstrated, with maple leaf flags in their hands. Thousands converged on Montreal, 
from all parts of the country, to plead for ‘national unity’. Emotion ran just as high on the other 
side when the independence option was defeated by 1.6 per cent of the vote.  Quebec’s prime 
minister, a man of liberal outlook and demeanour  – a graduate of the London School of 
Economics no less  – publicly blamed “money and the ethnic vote” for the defeat. Kymlicka 
would be hard put to deny that at that moment the division in Quebec between ‘us’, the pristine 
nation, and ‘them’, the scheming outsiders and disloyal minorities, was as profound as anything 
one might encounter in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Much of public opinion in Quebec, to its credit, was embarrassed by the prime minister’s 
outburst and English Canada returned to its imperturbable ways. However, these few days in 
Canadian history underscored the extreme fragility of liberal pluralism even where it is most 
profoundly anchored.  As Kymlicka wrote a few years ago in a commentary on Charles Taylor, “I 
suspect that the extent to which a nationalist movement is liberal will largely depend on whether 
or not it arises within a country with long-established liberal institutions” (McKim and McMahan 
1997: 64).  This is perfectly true but the limits of liberalism are readily attained. When applied to 
Central and Eastern Europe, where liberal institutions have not thriven in the past and are weak at  
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present, ‘exporting’ liberal pluralism requires more forbearance and patience than Kymlicka 
would allow. 
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